

# NICScatter: Backscatter as a Covert Channel in Mobile Devices

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


上海科技大学  
ShanghaiTech University





香港科技大學  
THE HONG KONG  
UNIVERSITY OF SCIENCE  
AND TECHNOLOGY

# Is Our Data Safe Enough ?



# Information Leakage under Isolation




# Covert Communication through Backscatter



NICScatter: backscatter through commercial NICs


System vulnerabilities in smartphone and Linux notebook

# Backscatter Basics




# Backscatter through Commercial NICs






Vector Network Analyzer



BCM 1045 Wi-Fi NIC

# NICScatter Efficiency


Model	Off State	On State
BCM1045, ant1	12.4+j14.4	106.9-j9.8
Intel5300, ant1	119.0+j137.0	80.3+j66.8
Intel5300, ant2	54.3+j122.7	57.7+j78.4






# NICScatter Efficiency


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# Reflection Diversities




Intel 5300




Atheros AR9285


# Reflection Diversities




On Off Position Modulation (OOPM)




# Latency Diversities




# Latency Diversities



On Off Position Modulation (OOPM)




# How to Hide the Communication ?




# RFKILL system

```
# file: rfkill
# owner: root
# group: netdev
user::rw-
user:testu:rw-
group::rw-
mask::rw-
other::r--
```




# Android App Permissions

- Dangerous Permissions
  - READ\_CALENDAR, CAMERA, READ\_SMS, READ\_CALL\_LOG ...
- Normal Permissions
  - SET\_ALARM, SET\_TIME\_ZONE, ...  
**CHANGE\_WIFI\_STATE**








# Attack Scenario



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


# Attack Scenario




# Attack Scenario

TPLink 4300




HP Elitebook 8530P



HP Elitebook 8530P

# Limitations and Discussion


- Communication Distance
  - SINR, NIC Models, Antenna Gain, etc.
  - Interference Cancellation
- Data Rate
  - Software: NIC Driver, Hardware: On-off processing logic
  - Fast impedance change
- Possible Applications
  - Cross Protocol Communication, Wireless Sensing, etc.



**Thank you!**

Backup Slides

# On-o Position Modulation (OOPM)





# Transmission Time of Sensitive Information

Data	bits	Laptop@30cm	USRP@90cm
MAC Address	48	49 sec	54 sec
Plain Password	64	1.09 min	1.20 min
MD5	128	2.18 min	2.40 min
GPS Coordinate	128	2.18 min	2.40 min
SHA1 Hash	160	2.72 min	3.00 min
Disk Encryption Key	256	4.35 min	4.80 min

# Receiving Range

